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Abstract
The examination of long-term Japanese data on interregional migration revealed three
stylized facts of migration behavior. Based on the facts, we formulated an operational
model and estimated interregional utility diﬀerentials. We found that the interregional utility
diﬀerentials have been converging until the late 1970s. We showed that the utility estimates
are highly correlated with per capita real income. We also applied the model to interregional
migration in the United States and Canada as well as the interindustry movement in Japan
and conﬁrmed the model’s validity.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There are diverse reasons for human migration. These reasons are not just based on economic
factors but also on non-economic factors. In the process of urbanization and economic devel-
opment, one-way migration from rural to urban areas is dominant. This is because economic
factors such as wage diﬀerential and employment opportunities are crucial. In developed coun-
tries, however, the amount of net migration has decreased signiﬁcantly compared to the gross
migration recently. This may indicate the importance of non-economic factors such as marriage,
admission into school, retirement, and regional amenities. Thus, we should consider utility in a
broader sense such that it includes both economic and non-economic factors.
It is widely observed in developed countries that there are many migration ﬂows from regions
i to j, and there are many migration ﬂows from j to i. The prevalence of such two-way migration
may imply that migration is based on non-economic factors, which diﬀer among individuals. On
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1the other hand, net migration ﬂows are much smaller than gross ones. This may indicate that
economic factors are losing their signiﬁcance nowadays.
Crozet (2004) and Pons, Paluzie, Silvestre and Tirado (2007) estimated interregional migra-
tion ﬂows based on the new economic geography (Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002), wherein migrants
consider real income, i.e., economic factors when making migration decisions. However, they
would also take into account non-economic factors such as regional amenities. Kahn (1995) and
Cragg and Kahn (1997) applied the hedonic approach by estimating regional wages and rent,
which are considered to capitalize diﬀerentials in regional utilities including amenities.1Insofar
as utilities constitute such a large number of factors, it may be diﬃcult to incorporate all of the
factors when estimating the utilities. Therefore, we instead estimate the utility values directly
by using migration data. This is based on Samuelson’s (1948) revealed preference as well as
Tiebout’s (1956) voting with one’s feet.
In this paper, we focus on measuring the interregional utility diﬀerentials in the presence of
migration costs. In the next section, we present empirical evidence of the stylized facts revealed
in migration studies. Based on these stylized facts, we construct an operational model for utility
estimation in section 3. Its robustness is checked with regard to various aspects in section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Three stylized facts on migration
People do not migrate very frequently. According to Japanese statistics, the average ratio of
the annual gross migration to the population is 2.9%. Since the average Japanese life span is 81
years, people engage in interprefectural migration only 2.3 times in their entire life. However,
this ﬁgure includes residential relocation without changing one’s job, and hence, people migrate
across regions only twice in their entire life. The very small ratio of migrants to non-migrants is
attributed to the high ﬁxed costs of interregional migration, which also includes non-pecuniary
costs like local information and human relations. Therefore, the ﬁr s ts t y l i z e df a c ti st h ee x i s t e n c e
of migration costs.
Net migration is less than gross migration. Denote the gross migration from regions i to j
f o rag i v e np e r i o do ft i m eb ymij, and the corresponding net migration by ∆mij ≡ mij − mji.




j=1,i6=j mij was 166 million during the last 52 years, and there is no decreasing trend
of gross migration as seen in Figure 1. On the other hand, the interprefectural net migration




j=1,i<j |∆mij| was 15.9 million during the same period, and has been decreasing over
time. Since the ratio of net migration to gross migration is only 9.6%, it can be stated that
more than 90% of the migration is “seemingly wasteful”.23 Thus, the second stylized fact is
seemingly wasteful migration, which, however, must be rational once we introduce individual
heterogeneity, as will be explained below.
Rational individuals would migrate from low- to high-utility regions although the speed of
migration adjustment is not as fast as that of price adjustments. In evolutionary game theory
(Weibull, 1995), this property is referred to as payoﬀ monotonicity, wherein a region with a
higher utility has a higher growth rate of population. In other words, the direction of net
migration coincides with the utility diﬀerentials:
sgn(∆mij)=s g n( Uj − Ui) (1)
where Uj is the intertemporal utility in region j deﬁned by the discounted stream of instantaneous
utilities in each period. If the payoﬀ monotonicity (1) holds for any pair of regions, migration
ﬂows are said to be transitive:
if ∆mij > 0 and ∆mjk > 0,t h e n∆mik > 0 (2)
due to transitivity of the utilities: if Ui <U j and Uj <U k,t h e nUi <U k.S t a t e d d i ﬀer-
ently,collective preferences are not cyclic, which is in agreement with Tiebout’s voting with
one’s feet.
Since there were n =4 6prefectures until 1972 and n =4 7prefectures from 1973 in Japan,
there are nC3 combinations of net migration among three regions, and nC3 × 52 ≈ 800,000
combinations of net migrations among the three regions for 52 years. Computing all combi-
nations, we found that 88% of them satisfy the transitivity condition (2). If the prefectures
are aggregated into 9 regions as will be done later, then 95% of them satisfy the transitivity
2This 90% refers to the Grubel-Lloyd (1971) index in international trade, which is deﬁned by
GL =1−
S
i |Xi − Mi|
S
i (Xi + Mi)













3These values in the United States during the 16 years from ﬁscal year 1989 to 2004 are as follows. The average
ratio of the annual gross migration to the population is 1.1%, the interstate gross migration is 45.7 million the
interstate net migration is 6.4 million, and the ratio of net migration to gross migration is 14%. Hence, 86% of
the migration is “seemingly wasteful”.
3condition.4 Hence, the volume of anti-transitive migration is extremely small compared to that
of transitive migration, evidencing Tiebout’s voting with one’s feet hypothesis. We can therefore
state that the third stylized fact is payoﬀ monotonicity. Individuals tend to migrate from low-
to high-utility regions, whose rankings are in agreement among heterogeneous individuals at a
macro level. It thus follows that the utility ranking of regions may be possible based on the
migration data.
3 Analytical framework for utility estimation
As mentioned in the introduction, there are short-run adjustment of commodity markets and
long-run adjustments in the labor markets. Excess demand for goods and services is quickly
diminished by interregional movements of goods and interregional adjustments in prices, wages
and rent in the short run. However, the adjustments in the interregional labor markets take time
due to diverse constraints. For example, some people do not migrate immediately because they
are too young to enter interregional job markets, because they are bound by a multiyear contract
at their ﬁrms, or because their psychic costs of adapting to new environments are considerable.
In this paper, we focus on the long-run adjustments by paying attention to the above mentioned
three stylized facts, and formulate a model that satisﬁes the following criteria.
(i) As per the ﬁrst stylized fact, interregional migration costs should be explicitly incorpo-
rated so that the percentage of non-migrants is considerable.
(ii) As per the second stylized fact, a microeconomic foundation, not for net migration, but
for gross migration should be established.
(iii) As per the third stylized fact, the model should satisfy the payoﬀ monotonicity (1).
The ﬁrst and second stylized facts may be captured by the introduction of heterogeneity in the
individual preference of regions. This may be possible by discrete choice models, such as logit and
probit (Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1992), where individual preference in their perception
of the attributes and characteristics associated with a particular region is heterogeneous. These
models have a common microfoundation that each individual maximizes one’s utility under
imperfect information or under heterogeneity in the following manner. An individual residing
in i will decide to migrate to region j if
Uj − cij =m a x
k
{Uk − cik}
4In the United States during the 16 years from ﬁscal year 1989 to 2004, 92% satisfy the transitivity condition
for interstate migration with n =5 1 ,a n d99% satisfy the transitivity condition for interregional migration n =9 .
4where cij is the migration costs from i to j which comprise non-pecuniary ﬁxed costs. Assume
further that individuals are heterogeneous in their perception of the attributes and characteristics
associated with a particular region. Suppose the intertemporal utility is Ui = ui + εi,w h e r eui
is the deterministic intertemporal utility and εi is the random variable, which is independently
and identically distributed across individuals with zero mean. We assume that the distribution




k=1 exp(uk − cik)/α
where the randomness parameter α expresses the degree of heterogeneity in regional preference.
Figure 2 displays the density function of individual preference for two regions. The ﬂatter
density function is associated with the larger value of α, which implies heterogeneous preference
and strong attachment to a particular region. On the other hand, the steeper density function
with the smaller α implies greater homogeneous preference with greater sensitivity to the utility
diﬀerentials than attachment to a region. An individual with positive εji values region i relative
to region j, i.e., the individual exhibits greater attachment to region i. Residents in i (resp. j)
with εji >u i − uj + cij (resp. εji <u i − uj − cij)m i g r a t ef r o mi to j (resp. j to i): their share
is represented by the right (resp. left) shaded area. Otherwise, they would stay in i (resp. j),
and the share of these individuals is 1 minus the right (resp. left) shaded area. According to the
ﬁrst stylized fact on migration costs, the shaded areas must be small enough. The net migration
is given by the diﬀerence between the two shaded areas, which must be smaller according to the
second stylized fact on seemingly wasteful migration versus net migration.
It should be noted that Pij is the probability when an individual in region i chooses region
j if she receives equal opportunities with respect to, say, job oﬀer or admission to a school.
However, such opportunities are considered to be proportional to the size of the labor market
in the destination region, Lj. Since the number of potential migrants in region i is Li, the gross
migration is speciﬁed as the product of these terms:
mij = LiLjPij. (3)
Note that (3) is free from the aggregation of regions because gross migration is proportional
to the sizes of both origin and destination.5 Such gravity-type modeling is popular in dealing
with interzonal traﬃc ﬂows (Wilson, 1970) as well as interregional migration in the literature.
In order to understand the aggregation problem, consider the case that the three regions are
symmetrically located with an identical size and utility level. Then, it follows that mij = m for
5Logit model of mij = LiPij does not satisfy the property.
5all i 6= j.I fr e g i o n s1 and 2 were to be aggregated, then gross migration from the aggregated
region would be doubled. This is simply because the supply of migrants would be artiﬁcially
doubled. Similarly, gross migration to the aggregated region would also be doubled because
demand for migrants is artiﬁcially doubled.
Assume further that c ≡ cij −cii is large enough based on the ﬁrst stylized fact on migration
costs. This means that the ﬁxed costs of migration are large relative to the distance-related costs
of migration. This is reﬂected by the fact that transport costs of migration are small relative to
non-transport costs, such as adjustment costs in a destination region. Then, (3) is rewritten as
mij = LiLj
exp(uj − cij)/α
exp(ui − cii)/α +
P









=2( uj − ui)/α. (5)
We adopt the regression equation (5), because it does not involve migration costs cij, and because
it is consistent with the three stylized facts on interregional migration.6
It should be emphasized that involving migration costs cij raises a serious problem in esti-
mating the utilities. In order to understand the problem, imagine a case that the three regions
are located such that (c12,c 23,c 13)=( ¯ c,¯ c,2¯ c) so that region 2 is the center and the other regions
are peripheries. For simplicity, assume identical size Li =1 , identical utility level ¯ u,a n dα =1 .
Then, from (4),
m12 − m21 =
eu2−¯ c
eu1 + eu2−¯ c + eu3−2¯ c −
eu1−¯ c
eu1−¯ c + eu2 + eu3−¯ c
=
e¯ c − 1
(e¯ c +2 )( e2¯ c + e¯ c +1 )
> 0
6There are other speciﬁcation candidates, such as the ﬁrst-order Taylor series expansion
mij − mji = s(uj − ui)
the replicator dynamic by Wall (2001)
mij − mji
LiLj







= s(uj − ui)
where s is a constant. However, none of them exhibited a better ﬁt in terms of adjusted R
2 than (5), and the last
one does not satisfy the third stylized fact of payoﬀ monotonicity (1).
6holds. This shows that in the presence of migration costs, net migration always occurs even
though there is no utility diﬀerential. This means that payoﬀ monotonicity does not hold insofar
as migration costs are present.
Conversely, what if net migration is zero (mij = mji) and the utility of the center is diﬀerent
from that in the peripheries (u2 6= u1 = u3)? It can be readily shown that the utility of
the center is lower than that in the peripheries under zero net migration, which is indeed
problematic. Such a problem arises because utilities are not identiﬁable in the speciﬁcation of
(4): the utility in destination region j diﬀers from where a migrant comes from. In order to
avoid the identiﬁcation problem, it is imperative not to include distance-related migration costs
cij in the utility estimation.
4 Estimation method
Usually, in estimating (5), each utility ui is expressed by a function of regional attributes, such
as wages, prices, rent, amenities, and so on, which are referred to as determinants of migration.
However, the choice of attributes and the functional form of the utility are ad hoc. In fact,
according to Greenwood (1975, 1985), there are diverse determinants of interregional migration,
all of which are not used as independent variables due to econometric problems, such as mul-
ticollinearity. Furthermore, there are a variety of speciﬁcations of (indirect) utility functions in
t h el i t e r a t u r e( B a l d w i net al., 2003). We therefore do not use a set of regional attributes as
independent variables with a particular utility function. Instead, we directly estimate the values
of the utilities themselves by using regional dummy variables only as independent variables.







bkDk + eij i,j =1 ,...,nand i 6= j (6)
with no intercept for each year. The regression coeﬃcient is bk = uk/α, the residual term is eij,
and the dummy variable is
Dk =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1 if k = j
−1 if k = i
0 otherwise.
There are nC2 regional pairs, which is the number of observations. Note that D1 should be
dropped from the RHS of (6) because of linear dependency
Pn
k=1 Dk =0 .S i n c ebk = bk − b1 =
(uk − u1)/α holds for k =2 ,...,n, we are able to estimate the utility diﬀerentials up to the
multiple of the heterogeneity parameter α.
7If a person migrates from regions i to j and migrates back from j to i in the same period, it
is not counted as gross migration. Such return migration often takes place for a longer period,
e.g. ﬁve years in the censuses of Japan and the United States. In this case, the number of
return migrants should be subtracted from the numerator and denominator of the LHS of (6).
However, this is not possible insofar as the number of return migrants is unknown. We therefore
use the annual data instead of the ﬁve-year census data in estimating (6).
4.1 Interregional migration in Japan
Due to the residence register system of Japan, the interprefectural migration matrix has been
published annually since 1954. Utilizing these annual data for 1954-2005, we aggregate the
prefectures into n =9regions (see Appendix (i) for details of the aggregation). This is because
migrants would not correctly recognize the distinction between regional utilities without regional
aggregation, i.e., n =4 7prefectures, and because large metropolitan areas extend through
several prefectures.
We ran regression (6) for n =9regions for each year from 1954 to 2005. For example, the
result for the year 2005 is summarized as follows:
b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9
coeﬃcient 0.02 0.38 0.10 0.33 0.19 0.13 0.04 0.10
adjusted R2 =0 .90,S Df o re a c hbi =0 .029,N O B= nC2 =3 6
We observe that the utility in region 3, which includes Tokyo, is the highest and that in region
5, which includes Nagoya, is the second highest. Furthermore, most of the coeﬃcient estimates
in diﬀerent years are similar, the adjusted R2 are high (the average is 0.79), and the common
standard errors are small relative to the coeﬃcient estimates. This conﬁrms the adequacy of the
speciﬁcation (6).
Assuming that heterogeneity parameter α does not vary over time, we set α =1 .I no r d e r
to see the change in the regional ranking, deﬁne the standardized utility as
ˆ ui ≡ ui − ¯ u = bi −¯ b
where ¯ u = 1
n
P
j uj is the average utility and ¯ b = 1
n
P
j bj =( ¯ u − u1)/α is the average coeﬃcient
estimate. Figure 3 presents the values in the standardized utility ˆ ui for region i =1 ,...,9 for the
study period. Although there are a few peaks and troughs, we can observe a regular tendency
in which the standardized utilities roughly converge over time.
8In order to conﬁrm this conjecture, deﬁne the utility diﬀerential (UD) index as the standard

















Figure 4 shows the decreasing trend of the UD with the simple average of 0.17. In fact, if we
conduct a simple regression of the UD on the year, then the regression coeﬃcient of the year is
negative and highly signiﬁcant with a t-value of −9.45. We thus conclude that the interregional
utility diﬀerential in Japan has been roughly decreasing after World War II.7
Why is the adjustment speed toward interregional equilibrium (ui =¯ u, ∀i) so slow? While
the interregional price diﬀerentials in traded goods diminish quickly, the interregional utility
diﬀerential converges at a relatively slower rate. This may be ascribed to the ﬁrst stylized fact
on migration costs: there exist many constraints in migration adjustment. For example, students
are unable to enter interregional job markets until graduation, recruitment examinations do not
take place very frequently, and the decision to migrate to a distant place takes time. Note that
while interregional equilibrium of commodity prices, wages and rent is attained in the short run,
spatial equilibrium of equalizing interregional utility levels would be attained in the long run as
is discussed in new economic geography (Krugman, 1991).
Why do the interregional utility diﬀerentials diverge in some periods, such as prior to 1960,
1975-85, and after 1995, which exhibit positive slopes in Figure 4? While there is a market
mechanism through migration adjustments to diminish the utility diﬀerentials, each utility itself
changes continually due to rapid changes in regional economic environments, e.g. rapidly grow-
ing sectors in some regions. The changes are so rapid that the migration toward interregional
equilibrium may not catch up. As Evans (1990) argues, “it is diﬃcult to generate a convinc-
ing theoretical argument which would reconcile the assumption with continuing existence of
persistent patterns of migration.”
5 Robustness checks
In this section, we check the robustness of the model (5) in three diﬀerent ways.
7As a robustness check, we also analyzed the case of n =4 6prefectures. It was revealed that the values of the
UD is very similar: the correlation between the UD with n =9and the UD with n =4 6was 0.99. However, the
average adjusted R
2 of the 52 years of the period 1954-2005 is 0.38 i nt h ec a s eo fn =4 6 .T h i si sp o s s i b l yb e c a u s e
some prefectures are so small that big metropolitan areas like Tokyo are divided into a few prefectures.
95.1 Interindustry movement in Japan
Our model would be applicable to any mobility between subgroups insofar as it satisﬁes the
three stylized facts, which may be true for interindustry mobility. In order to examine this, we
constructed Japanese interindustry mobility matrices for the years for which the Employment
Status Survey was conducted, namely, 1968, 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997 and 2002 (see
A p p e n d i x( i i )f o rt h ee x p l a n a t i o no ft h ei n d u s t r i e s ) .W er a nt h es a m er e g r e s s i o n( 6 )f o rn =7
industries. The result for the year 2002 is as follows:
b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7
coeﬃcient 0.15 0.44 0.17 0.27 0.63 0.28
adjusted R2 =0 .65,S Df o re a c hbi =0 .106,N O B= nC2 =2 1
In the remaining seven years, the coeﬃc i e n te s t i m a t e sa r em o r eo rl e s ss i m i l a r ,a n dt h ea d j u s t e d
R2 are high (the average is 0.65), implying the appropriateness of our model. The value of the
UD with α =1is between 0.19 and 0.33 with a simple average of 0.26. Unlike the interregional
utility diﬀerential, the interindustry utility diﬀerential does not exhibit convergence during the
study period.
5.2 Interregional migration in the United States and Canada
The second check is conducted by using the data of the interregional migration ﬂows in the United
States and Canada, where the stylized facts seem to hold as well. In the United States, 51 states
are aggregated into 9 regions: 1 New England, 2 Middle Atlantic, 3 East North Central, 4 West
North Central, 5 South Atlantic, 6 East South Central, 7 West South Central, 8 Mountain, and
9P a c i ﬁc (see Appendix (iii) for these deﬁnitions). Then, we have 9 × 9 interregional migration
matrices for 16 years from the ﬁscal year 1989 to 2004. As in the Japanese case, we ran regression
(6) each year from 1989 to 2004 for the United States. For example, the result for 2004 is as
follows:
b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9
coeﬃcient −0.01 0.01 0.14 0.50 0.43 0.33 0.49 0.18
adjusted R2 =0 .87,S Df o re a c hbi =0 .053,N O B= nC2 =3 6
In the other years, the coeﬃcient estimates are similar, the average adjusted R2 is 0.90,a n d
the common standard error is small relative to the coeﬃcient estimates,all of which verify the
validity of our model. Next, the value of the UD with α =1is shown to range from 0.14 to
100.27 with a simple average of 0.20. Regressing the UD on the year yields a negative regression
coeﬃcient with a t-value of −2.94, thus implying the converging trend in the interregional utility
diﬀerential.8
We also run the regression using the interprovincial migration data of Census Canada with
n =1 3provinces during the ﬁve year period of 1996-2001 (Appendix (iv)), we do the same. The
result is as follows:
b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 b10 b11 b12 b13
coeﬃcient 1.02 0.90 0.90 0.57 1.08 0.80 0.86 1.65 0.94 0.54 0.65 0.70
adjusted R
2 =0 .72,S Df o re a c hbi =0 .124,N O B= nC2 =7 8
If the provinces are aggregated into n =5regions according to the deﬁnitions by Rogers, Raymer
and Newbold (2003), we obtain an adjusted R2 =0 .78. Setting α =1 , the computed UD is 0.38
for n =1 3 ,a n d0.34 for n =5 . These results for Canada are rather similar to those for Japan
and the United States. Thus, the robustness of our model is also veriﬁed by the American and
Canadian data.
5.3 Comparison with real income
The ﬁnal robustness check involves the comparison of the utility estimates with the real income
in order to examine whether the estimated utilities are reliable or not. If the utilities are correctly
estimated by (6), then they would be highly correlated with the per capita real income. In order
to verify this, we run the pooled regression:






δtYt + eit i =1 ,...,nand t = t1,...,t 2
without intercept, where Iit is the per capita real income deﬁned by the per capita nominal
income divided by the consumer price index in region i and year t, Rj is the regional dummy,
Yt is the year dummy, and β, γj and δt are the regression coeﬃcients. The regional dummies
are needed because there are non-economic factors, such as regional amenities, which are not
captured by the per capita real income. The year dummies are also needed because booms and
recessions are not controlled by the per capita real income.
We ﬁrst ran the pooled regression using Japanese data. Due to the constraint of the consumer
price index, the data was available for the period of 1979-2002 (Appendix (v-vi)). The pooled
regression produces a good ﬁt. Almost all the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, and the adjusted R2 is
8We also analyzed the case of n =5 1states. It was revealed that the values of the UD are very similar: the
correlation between the UD with n =9and the UD with n =5 1is 0.95. However, the average adjusted R
2 of the
16 years of 1989-2004 is 0.65 in the case of n =5 1 . Again, this is possibly because some states are too small.
110.84. Since the data on the per capita income is available for the longer period of 1955-2002, we
also ran the same regression by replacing Iit with the per capita nominal income for the study
period. This regression performed well too: almost all the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, and the
adjusted R2 is 0.75.
We then ran the pooled regression using American data by replacing Iit with the per capita
nominal income for the study period of 1989-2004 (Appendix (vii)). Again, this regression
performed very well: almost all the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, and the adjusted R2 is 0.90.
Hence, we conclude that these results support the validity of the utility estimation.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Three stylized facts in migration behavior are revealed from the Japanese data from 1954 to
2005. Based on the stylized facts, we developed an operational model for analyzing interregional
migration as well as intersectoral mobility. Unlike the previous literature, our model does not
need to impose any ad hoc assumptions on the utility function. Using the interprefectural
migration data in Japan, we estimated the interregional utility diﬀerentials. Estimation results
suggest that our model produces an extremely good ﬁt for each year, and that interregional
utility diﬀerentials have been converging particularly until the late 1970s.
In order to check the robustness of our model, we ﬁrst applied the model to the intersectoral
mobility in Japan and estimated the intersectoral utility diﬀerentials, and conﬁrmed the good ﬁt
of our model. We then ran regressions using interregional migration ﬂows in the United States
and Canada, conﬁrming its validity in this context as well. Finally, we regressed the utility
estimates on the real wages, and obtained high correlations. Hence, the model presented in
this paper is considered to be useful in estimating utility diﬀerentials between regions as well as
between industry sectors.
Data Appendix
(i) Interprefectural migration in Japan is in the Report on Internal Migration in Japan
(Japanese Statistics Bureau) for 1954-2005. Following Ishikawa (2001), 47 prefectures are ag-
gregated into 9 regions: region 1 is Hokkaido; region 2 consists of Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita,
Yamagata, Fukushima and Niigata prefectures; region 3 consists of Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gumma,
Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Yamanashi and Nagano prefectures; region 4 consists of
Toyama, Ishikawa and Fukui prefectures; region 5 consists of Gifu, Shizuoka, Aichi and Mie
prefectures; region 6 consists of Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara and Wakayama prefectures;
12region 7 consists of Tottori, Shimane, Okayama, Hiroshima and Yamaguchi prefectures; region 8
consists of Tokushima, Kagawa, Ehime and Kochi prefectures; and region 9 consists of Fukuoka,
Saga, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Oita, Miyazaki and Kagoshima prefectures. Okinawa prefecture is
excluded in the regressions.
(ii) Interindustry mobility in Japan is in the Employment Status Survey in Japan
(Japanese Statistics Bureau, 1968, 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997 and 2002). Unlike the
interregional migration, this is the sample survey of 440,000 households. 13 industries are ag-
gregated into 7 industries: 1 manufacturing and mining, 2 construction, 3 electricity, gas, water,
transportation and communication, 4 wholesale and retail trade, 5 ﬁnance, insurance and real
estate, 6 services, and 7 government. Agriculture, forestry, hunting, ﬁsheries, aquaculture and
unclassiﬁed industry are excluded.
(iii) Interstate migration in the United States is in the State-to-State Migration Data
(Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury) for the ﬁscal year 1989-2004.
51 states are aggregated into 9 regions: region 1 is New England consisting of Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont; region 2 is Middle Atlantic
consisting of New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania; region 3 is East North Central consisting
of East North Central, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin; region 4 is West North
Central consisting of Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South
Dakota; region 5 is South Atlantic consisting of Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia; region 6 is East South
Central consisting of Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee; region 7 is West South
Central consisting of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas; region 8 is Mountain consisting
of Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming; and region
9i sP a c i ﬁc consisting of Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington.
(iv) Interprovincial migration in the Canada is in Proﬁle of the Canadian Population
by Mobility Status: Canada, a Nation on the Move (2001 Census: Analysis Series, Catalogue
no. 96F0030XIE2001006) for the period of 1996-2001.
(v) Consumer price index in Japan is in the Annual Report on the Consumer Price
Index, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communications for 1979-2002.
(vi) Per capita income in Japan is the prefectural income divided by prefectural popula-
tion for 1955-2002. The data are in the Annual Report on Prefectural Accounts, Economic and
Social Research Institute, Cabinet Oﬃce.
(vii) Per capita income in the United States is the state personal income divided by
state population for 1989-2004. The data are in the Regional Economic Accounts, Bureau of
13Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
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Figure 3:  Estimated utility differentials in 9 regions